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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260407T070437Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Sydney:20140726T050000
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Sydney:20140726T130000
SUMMARY:The Procreation Asymmetry
UID:20260408T014908Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-r5qzs
TZID:Australia/Sydney
LOCATION:Wagga Wagga\, Australia
DESCRIPTION:<p>Workshop on 'The Procreation Asymmetry'<br> Saturday July 26th\, 2014<br> 12.30-4pm<br> Charles Sturt University<br> Wagga Wagga\, Australia<br> <br> Workshop Abstract<br> Commonsense suggests that procreation is permissible only if it will give rise to the existence of a being with a life worth living. A child\, for instance\, whose entire life will be filled with pain should not be brought into existence. However\, it seems that procreation is almost never required. For instance\, a couple may choose not to have children even if they are confident that their children would lead very happy lives. Despite the plausibility of these two common-sense claims\, it turns out to be very hard to reconcile them. To see the problem\, consider the following question: why would it wrong be to create a child whose life wouldn't be worth living? Here is one attractive answer: creating such a child would be wrong because we are obligated\, generally speaking\, to produce the best possible outcome. An outcome involving a child whose life isn't worth living is a worse outcome than the alternative where that child is never brought into existence\, so therefore we shouldn't create such a child. The problem with this answer is that it implies that procreation is often morally required. Consider again the couple whose children (if created) would be very happy. Surely an outcome involving very happy children is better than the alternative where those children never come into existence. Thus\, this view implies that the childless couple must procreate. If not\, they have acted wrongly. The aim of this workshop is to evaluate the prospects of vindicating the intuitive asymmetry outlined at the start: that we are obligated not to create miserable children\, but have no obligation to create happy children.<br> <br> Rationale<br> The workshop will focus on the work of one of the leading theorists on procreation ethics\, Jeff McMahan. McMahan is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University\, and is the author of many seminal articles and books\, including The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (OUP\, 2002) and Killing in War (OUP\, 2009).<br> <br> Confirmed Participants<br> Jeff McMahan (Rutgers University)\, John Broome (University of Oxford)\, Toby Handfield (Monash University)\, Greg Bognar (Latrobe University)\, Daniel Halliday (University of Melbourne)\, Robyn Kath (University of Sydney)\, Daniel Cohen (Charles Sturt University)\, Wylie Breckenridge (Charles Sturt University)<br> <br> Workshop Co-sponsorship<br> We gratefully acknowledge funding from the Society for Applied Philosophy\, the School of Humanities and Social Sciences (CSU)\, and the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CSU).<br> <br> Registration<br> There is no registration fee\, however participants will need to cover their own travel and accommodation costs. (Lunch will be provided for all participants.) In order to maintain a focussed workshop format\, we will need to cap the total number of participants\, so please contact Daniel Cohen to register for the event by the 10th of July. &nbsp\;Please also contact Daniel if you wish to present a short (15-30 minute) paper at the workshop.<br> <br> Contact<br> Daniel Cohen<br> Senior Lecturer in Philosophy<br> Charles Sturt University<br> Boorooma Street\, Wagga Wagga\, New South Wales\, Australia\, 2678<br> +61 2 6933 2565<br> <a href="mailto:dcohen@csu.edu.au">dcohen@csu.edu.au</a><br> Charles Sturt University</p>
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