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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260413T184111Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Prague:20260910T140000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Prague:20260912T170000
SUMMARY:Faces of Subjectivity. A workshop on inner awareness in the context of monistic theories of phenomenal consciousness
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TZID:Europe/Prague
LOCATION:Jilska 361\, Praha\, Czech Republic
DESCRIPTION:<p>Keynote speakers:&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Robert J. Howell (Rice)</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Anna Giustina (Valencia)</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Sam Coleman (Birkbeck)</strong></p>\n<p>While the debate about phenomenal consciousness so far has mainly focused on the nature of the qualitative features one encounters in being conscious (e.g. the bitterness of espresso\, the feel of mental effort\, etc.)\, our workshop will focus on the nature of this encounter itself\, i.e. of the special &lsquo\;inner&rsquo\; awareness (Brentano\, Kriegel) one seems to be afforded of one&rsquo\;s own qualitative states\, due to which these states are &lsquo\;for&rsquo\; their subject\, instantiating what Joseph Levine has called &lsquo\;subjectivity&rsquo\;. Since it&rsquo\;s unclear whether and how this subjectivity of conscious states can be accounted for reductively\, we view its existence as an important challenge for the main forms of monism\, i.e. physicalism and Russellian monism. The aim of our workshop is to bring together leading thinkers working on inner\, or &lsquo\;subjective&rsquo\;\, awareness\, with those who defend various forms of monism\, and address the &lsquo\;subjectivity challenge&rsquo\; in a systematic manner\, examining its viability and significance in the broader context of consciousness studies.</p>\n<p>We aim to examine the following questions\, among others:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Is the distinction between qualitative character\, and &lsquo\;subjectivity&rsquo\; or inner awareness plausible? Is it supported by empirical research?</li>\n<li>Do representationalist understandings of inner awareness face any challenges and\, if so\, are there any viable alternatives to representationalism?</li>\n<li>Russellian monists posit &lsquo\;inscrutable&rsquo\; properties which enable us to account for consciousness. But can inscrutables also help us account for inner awareness/subjectivity?</li>\n<li>Are there forms of physicalism\, Russellian monism\, or monism in general that are particularly well positioned to account for inner awareness/subjectivity?</li>\n<li>Is inner awareness phenomenologically manifest and\, if so\, what is the nature of its phenomenological contribution?</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Presentations on other\, closely related topics are also welcome. The workshop is intended to be&nbsp\;<strong>in-person</strong>&nbsp\;and discussion-oriented &ndash\; presenters of contributed papers are given time slots of 45 minutes (including discussion).&nbsp\;The workshop will result in an edited volume published with an international publisher\, featuring\, in particular\, the contributions of the keynote speakers\, as well as papers by other participants and by experts in the field.</p>\n<p>If you&rsquo\;re interested in participating in the workshop\, please send an anonymized&nbsp\;<strong>700-word abstract</strong>&nbsp\;of your paper to&nbsp\;<a href="mailto:subjectivity@flu.cas.cz">subjectivity@flu.cas.cz</a>&nbsp\;<strong>by the end of May 2026</strong>. (This e-mail address can also be used for enquiries regarding the workshop).</p>\n<p>Notifications of acceptance: June 20th 2026.</p>\n<p>There is&nbsp\;<strong>no registration fee</strong>&nbsp\;for the workshop.</p>
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