Intensionalists claim that necessarily equivalent propositions are identical\; hyperintensionalists deny this. Whereas possible worlds semantics provides a canonical intensionalist framework\, there is no canonical hyperintensionalist framework. Recent years have rather seen a thousand flowers bloom with the \; development of truthmakers semantics\, aboutness theory\, grounding theory\, and logics of essence\, to mention but a few hyperintensionalist theories. \;
\nA lot of recent work has focused on various paradoxes that threaten hyperintensionalism - the so-called Russell-Myhill paradox in particular. We now have reason to think that these paradoxes can be resolved. \;
\nThe mere consistency of hyperintensionalist theories does not\, obviously\, mean that they are worth having. Even staunch adherents of hyperintensionalists approaches would admit that they are more complicated than their intensionalist competitors. So\, what work can be done by hyperintensionalists theories that cannot be done by their intensionalist competitors? Is the work being done worth the price of the greater complexity? The goal of the workshop is to bring together some leading proponents and opponents of hyperintensionalism to discuss these questions.
\nThe workshop will be held at St John's College\, Oxford\, 1-2 OCtober 2026.
\nDue to space constraints\, we ask participants to regsiter in advance at the following address: \;https://forms.office.com/e/mFnskUJKAb.
\nRegistration deadline is 2 weeks before the workshop\, or once the available spaces are filled.
\nUpdates to the timins and schedle will appear on this site.
ORGANIZER;CN="Øystein Linnebo";CN=Jon Litland;CN=Nicholas K. Jones: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR