Logic is often regarded as neutral within a theoretical\, conceptual framework.
\nOn a traditional view\, it is topic-neutral and metaphysically neutral: its laws and principles apply irrespective of subject matter\, abstracting from the particular domains to which they are applied. In this sense\, logic would provide a framework for reasoning independent of what we are reasoning about. Moreover\, as a scientific discipline\, logic is commonly expected to be neutral to social and political commitments. Indeed\, because of its high degree of abstraction\, this may be expected of logic more strongly than of most other disciplines.
\nMeanwhile\, the purely theoretical view on logic faces revisions from research practices through logical devices. Within a practical framework\, some philosophers and logicians have nevertheless questioned whether logic is genuinely neutral. For instance\, some have questioned whether topic-neutrality can be sustained considering debates over logical pluralism\, expressive power\, and domain pertinence. Others have discussed whether logic can\, in practice\, be disentangled from the social and institutional contexts in which it is developed\, taught\, and applied.
\nThis workshop will examine the idea of logical neutrality from multiple perspectives.
ORGANIZER;CN=Luis F. Bartolo Alegre;CN=Zhouwanyue Nata Yang: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR