Towards the beginning of his Encylopaedia Logic\, Hegel states that &lsquo\;logical determinations in general\, can be regarded as the definitions of the absolute\, as metaphysical definitions of God&rsquo\; (§\;85). And accordingly\, he often suggests that cognition of the absolute gives us knowledge of God. This position implies at least three claims: First\, that there is a distinct\, philosophical form of cognition\; second\, that the object of this cognition is the &lsquo\;absolute&rsquo\;\; and third\, that the &lsquo\;absolute&rsquo\; is what we do &ndash\; or should &ndash\; understand by &lsquo\;God&rsquo\;. But how exactly are these claims to be understood and what justifies them? And how do we get from Kant&rsquo\;s identification of the &lsquo\;Ideal&rsquo\; of pure reason\, an object that would bring reason&rsquo\;s demand for the &lsquo\;unconditioned&rsquo\; to rest\, with God and his denial that we can have theoretical knowledge of this object\, to Hegel&rsquo\;s assertions? In this year&rsquo\;s summer school\, we will be addressing these questions via close readings of selected texts from Kant\, Hegel\, Schelling and Fichte.
\nDiscussion sessions will be led by:
\nKeynote speakers will include:
\nIf you are a graduate student (MA or doctoral candidate) \; who would like to participate in the summer school\, please send a short CV and brief statement of interest (max. 1 page) combined into one document to Alex Englander: alexeng@uni-bonn.de (