BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260608T213430Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20140911T121500
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20140911T141500
SUMMARY:Fairness and the Puzzle of Disability
UID:20260609T070926Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Australia/Melbourne
LOCATION:Old Physics Building\, Parkville Campus\, Melbourne\, Australia
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Abstract:</strong> Consider two cases.&nbsp\; In Case 1\, you must decide whether you save the life of a disabled person or you save the life of a person with no disability.&nbsp\; In Case 2\, you must decide whether you save the life of a disabled person who would remain disabled\, or you save the life of another disabled person who\,in contrast\, would also be cured as a result of your intervention.&nbsp\; It seems that most people agree that you should give equal chances in Case 1: saving the life of the person with no disability would be unfair discrimination against the person with disability.&nbsp\; Yet\, in Case 2\, it appears that many people believe that you are at least permitted to save straightaway the person who would have no disability after your intervention.&nbsp\; There would be no unfair discrimination against the other person.<br><br>I argue that these judgments present a puzzle for theories of resource allocation in normative ethics.&nbsp\; The puzzle is straightforward for consequentialists: the two cases have the same outcomes\, but the judgments are different.&nbsp\; But the puzzle also presents a problem for nonconsequentialist views.&nbsp\; After introducing the cases\, I show this by reviewing a number of proposals for solving the puzzle.&nbsp\; I argue that none of these proposals are successful.&nbsp\; Alas\, I won't propose a solution of my own\; the best I can offer are some general remarks at the end.</p>
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR