BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260531T023431Z DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20141009T121500 DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20141009T141500 SUMMARY:Why Idealize? Hume Solved That UID:20260619T085840Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq TZID:Australia/Melbourne LOCATION:Old Physics Building\, Parkville Campus\, Melbourne\, Australia DESCRIPTION:

Abstract: Response-dependent accounts of normative or evaluative properties have been motivated by naturalistic concerns&mdash\;concerns with finding explanatory work for these properties to do within the causal order of things&mdash\;and also by the thought that reasons or value would lack authority for agents if those agents could be radically alienated from them. \; At the same time\, response-dependent accounts have typically explained normative and evaluative properties not in terms of people&rsquo\;s actual responses\, but instead their responses in idealized circumstances&mdash\;how the agent would respond if well informed\, thinking clearly\, and so on. \; David Enoch has argued forcefully that idealization is inconsistent with the theoretical motives behind response-dependent accounts. \; Idealization of the responses makes the properties accounted for less explanatory and more potentially alienating. \; I will argue the reverse\, focusing especially on the nature of dispositional explanations and how they provide a rationale for appealing to idealized responses.

ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR