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SUMMARY:Paradoxes\, Theory-Choice\, and Logic: Themes from Priest (Synthese Topical Collection)
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DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Call for Papers</strong>: <em>Paradoxes\, Theory-choice\, and Logic: Themes from Priest</em></p>\n\n<p><strong>Guest Editors: </strong>Ben Martin (University of Padua)\, Massimiliano Carrara (University of Padua)\, Samuele Iaquinto (University of Eastern Piedmont)\, Filippo Mancini (IUSS Pavia)</p>\n\n<p><strong>Topical Collection Description:</strong></p>\n<p>The aim of this Topical Collection is to bring together new research focused on themes from Graham Priest&rsquo\;s work on the philosophy of logic. Specifically\, non-classical solutions to the logico-semantic paradoxes\, the mechanisms of theory-choice in logic\, whether more than one logic could be true\, and logic&lsquo\;s normative role in reasoning. While each of these topics are recognized as important independently in the philosophy of logic\, Graham Priest is unusual in highlighting the connections between them\, such as the role of paradoxes in logical theory-choice\, the need for a monist comprehensive solution to the logical paradoxes\, and the role of normativity in selecting a logic.</p>\n\n<p>This Topical Collection invites contributions both on Priest&rsquo\;s own work on the philosophy of logic\, and research on the connections between paradoxes\, theory choice in logic\, logic&rsquo\;s normativity\, and the monist-pluralist debate.</p>\n\n<p><strong>Appropriate Topics for Submission include\, among others:</strong></p>\n\n<ul>\n<li>What role do the paradoxes play in logical theory-choice?</li>\n<li>How do we evaluate a good solution to the logic-semantic paradoxes?</li>\n<li>In what sense does logic use the same theory-choice criteria as the sciences?</li>\n<li>Is it possible to have a rational disagreement over whether contradictions are true or not?</li>\n<li>Is admitting truth-value gluts more philosophically troublesome than admitting truth-value gaps?</li>\n<li>Can the normativity of logic provide evidence for one logic over another?</li>\n<li>Is it necessary to have only one logic to solve all of the logico-semantic paradoxes?</li>\n<li>What theoretical costs are borne by embracing a non-classical solution to the paradoxes?</li>\n<li>&middot\;What is the case for a globally correct logic\, rather than domain-specific logics?</li>\n</ul>\n\n\n<p>For further information\, please contact the guest editor(s): Ben Martin (ben.lj.martin@gmail.com</a>).</p>\n\n<p>The deadline for submissions is <strong>30th September 2026</strong>.</p>\n\n<p>Submissions via: https://www.editorialmanager.com/synt/default.aspx</a></p>
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