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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20270731T090000
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SUMMARY:Special Issue of Philosophical Studies on Partial Aggregation 
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DESCRIPTION:<p>We are welcoming submissions to a <strong>Special Issue of Philosophical Studies on Partial Aggregation.</strong></p>\n<p>Papers should be submitted via the journal&rsquo\;s online submission system before <strong>31st July 2027</strong> (please indicate your submission is for consideration in relation to Partial Aggregation).</p>\n<p>We welcome submissions on any aspect of moral aggregation &ndash\; that is\, when and why the numbers count in ethics &ndash\; with a special interest in partial aggregation.</p>\n<p>Possible Topics include (but are not limited to)</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Is partial aggregation consistent or does it collapse into either full aggregation or scepticism about aggregation?</li>\n<li>Should partial aggregation be understood in terms of moral relevance\, lexicality\, axiological principles of priority or equality\, bounded aggregation\, or in some other way?</li>\n<li>Can partial aggregation be reconciled with individualist moral theory? What makes a moral theory &ldquo\;individualist&rdquo\; in the relevant sense? What is the best formulation of the so-called &ldquo\;individualist restriction&rdquo\;? What distinctive advantages and challenges come with a contractualist approach to partial aggregation\, or with a consequentialist one?</li>\n<li>What are moral claims\, and how do they relate to interests and reasons? What does it take for claims to be relevant to each other or to one&rsquo\;s decision? How should claims be balanced\, added up\, cancelled\, or otherwise combined?</li>\n<li>How should partial aggregation handle cases involving heterogeneous groups\, multiple options\, non-fixed populations\, quasi-competition\, risk\, and diachronic choices? How should we assess the extensional adequacy and explanatory power of a theory of partial aggregation?</li>\n<li>Do moral and political philosophy call for distinct theories of partial aggregation\, or will a unified account suffice? How does partial aggregation bear (for example) on public policy\, on the distribution of scarce medical resources\, and on the constraints we impose on AI agents?</li>\n</ul>\n<p>For more information\, see the special issue page here: <a href="https://link.springer.com/collections/aigddfdadc">https://link.springer.com/collections/aigddfdadc</a></p>\n<p>If you have any questions\, contact Milan Moss&eacute\; (<a href="mailto:milan_mosse@stanford.edu">milan_mosse@stanford.edu</a>).</p>\n<p>Lea Bourguignon (Cambridge)\, Jonas Harney (Fribourg)\, and Milan Moss&eacute\; (Stanford)\, special issue editors.</p>
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