The enactive approach challenges the idea that the mind is confined to the individual\, instead of emphasizing its emergence through dynamic interactions between self-constituting identities and their shared environments\, spanning ecological and social dimensions. Enactive research has identified three key dimensions of embodiment: organismic regulation\, sensorimotor coupling\, and intersubjective interaction. Each of these operates as a recursively self-producing process network with its own norms of continuation. Any given situation is thus structured by a web of organic\, sensorimotor\, and social norms\, whose unfolding involves a negotiation between these sometimes conflicting constraints. This very interplay&mdash\;where different levels of normativity co-determine one another&mdash\;is what makes the enactive perspective\, in contrast to more moderately embodied approaches\, fundamentally dialectical.
\nThe special issue aims to critically examine the claim that dialectics&mdash\;the process of transforming difference and otherness into dynamic identity&mdash\;is embedded in the very nature of the enactive approach.
\nKey questions include (but are not limited to):
\n- Does the enactive approach need to make its dialectical moves more explicit and what kind of dialectics might be best suited to the task?
\n- How is normativity scaffolded across biological and social domains?
\n- What roles do evolutionary\, organizational\, developmental\, technical\, and socio-linguistic factors play in driving cognitive complexity?
\n- How do these perspectives account for the scaling up from biological to cognitive autonomy?
\n- Does the enactive approach favor an additive or a transformative account of rationality?
\nInvited contributors
\nEzequiel Di Paolo\, Shaun Gallagher\, Laura Mojica\, Kate Nave\, Glenda Satne\, Dave Ward \;
\nFor further information: andrea.gambarotto@uni.lu \;
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