The philosophy department of TU Dortmund is organising a one-day workshop exploring the philosophical dimensions of (limitations of) reasoning in large language models. Early LLMs were notorious for frequently generating outputs that\, to users\, appeared to contain basic reasoning errors. However\, in recent years\, researchers and AI developers have invested much effort in improving the common-sense and formal reasoning capacities of transformer-based models through reinforcement learning and similar techniques. This has led to a generation of 'large reasoning models&rsquo\; that perform well on various benchmarks of reasoning problems. Still\, questions remain about how we should interpret these capacities. Do large reasoning models really engage in reasoning\, or merely in a statistical approximation of reasoning? What accounts of reasoning are available in the philosophical literature\, and are these accounts applicable to LLMs? Do LLMs fare differently with respect different kinds of reasoning (e.g. common-sense reasoning\, practical reasoning or counterfactual reasoning)? What are the risks of over-attributing reasoning capacities to LLMs? This workshop brings together philosophers who work on these and related questions.
\nSpeakers:
\nGregor Betz\, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
\nJaroslav Malik\, \;University of Hradec Krá\;lové\;
\nMirco Sambrotta\, Slovak Academy of Sciences
\nCordelia Berz\, LMU Munich
\nLeonard Dung\, Ruhr-University Bochum
\nThom-Felix Thormann\, Ruhr-University Bochum
\nJoris Graff\, TU Dortmund
\nAttendance is open to anyone interested\, but we would like to ask attendants to register in \;advance by sending an email to joris.graff@tu-dortmund.de. Registration is possible until October 26th. Upon registering\, the schedule will be provided via email.
ORGANIZER;CN=Joris Graff: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR