Abstract \;
\nStandard plural logics include a naï\;ve plural comprehension schema (NPC): for any condition &Phi\;\, if at least one individual satisfies it then there is a plurality of all and only those individuals which do so. Recently\, NPC has come under fire\, some denying that it&rsquo\;s a logical truth and some denying that it&rsquo\;s true at all. In this talk\, I defend NPC. First\, working within a natural deduction system for plural logic\, I defend its status as a logical truth. I then turn to the most popular argument against NPC\, namely that it conflicts with a plausible \;universalist \;principle about sets: for any things\, there exists the set of those things. Florio and Linnebo have used this argument to motivate their system of \;critical plural logic\, in which NPC is rejected in favour of some weaker comprehension axioms. I argue that the system is even weaker than Florio and Linnebo realize\, and highly unattractive compared to more traditional plural logics. Time permitting\, I&rsquo\;ll also argue that universalism about sets isn&rsquo\;t as compelling as it seems.
ORGANIZER;CN=Alessandro Torza: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR