BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261122T232557Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20261124T153000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20261124T170000
SUMMARY:Confrontations\, Representations\, and the Philosophy of Art
UID:20261123T002307Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-58d8844b6d-x5w2k
TZID:Europe/Vienna
LOCATION:Quellenstrasse 51\, Vienna\, Austria\, 1100
DESCRIPTION:<p>Confrontations\, Representations\, and the Philosophy of Art</p>\n<p>Abstract</p>\n<p>There seems to be a foundational\, if none to clear\, distinction between our encountering things and our encountering representations of things. This was\, I claim\, what Kendall Walton was attempting to clarify in his monumental work\, <em>Mimesis as Make-Believe</em> (Harvard\, 1990). However\, Walton's project has been largely misunderstood which has resulted in a great deal of confusion in much of what passes for the Philosophy of Fiction. In this paper I will argue that Walton's way of making the distinction is untenable and I will attempt to give it firmer foundations. Although the reconceptualised distinction is useful\, it lacks the grand explanatory sweep of Walton's project. I shall conclude by arguing that it is\, nonetheless\, an essential starting point for settling the myriad problems that arise in considering the representational arts.</p>
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