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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261111T163834Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261127T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261127T163000
SUMMARY:On the Explanatory Priority of Knowledge
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TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p>I would like to draw your attention to the following online philosophy seminar series hosted by Beijing Normal University&rsquo\;s Department of Philosophy.</p>\n<p>On November 27th\, 3pm&nbsp\;China Standard Time\,&nbsp\;Adam Marushak&nbsp\;(Associate Researcher at South China Normal University)&nbsp\;will be presenting a talk titled "On the Explanatory Priority of Knowledge&rdquo\;.</p>\n<p>Attendance is free.</p>\n<p>Please register for the event by sending an email to&nbsp\;m.dentith@bnu.edu.cn&nbsp\;for the Zoom link and password.</p>\n<p><strong>Abstract:</strong>&nbsp\;Knowledge-first epistemology is widely thought to give the state of knowledge explanatory priority over other epistemic states like justification and belief. I argue that this 'explanationist' characterization of the knowledge-first position is mistaken. The argument takes the form of a puzzle showing that a standard framing of the explanatory commitments of knowledge-first epistemology leads to a contradiction when combined with Timothy Williamson&rsquo\;s rejection of hyperintensional metaphysics.</p>\n<p>This puzzle\, I argue\, motivates abandoning the idea that explanatory priority supplies the right framework for thinking about what is essential to the knowledge-first approach. On my alternative proposal\, the core of the knowledge-first position lies instead in various necessary biconditionals providing 'weak' or 'strong' reductions of other epistemic states to knowledge. Formulating these modal principles requires only a lightweight metaphysics employing possible worlds. A consequence of this view is that knowledge-first epistemology is importantly different from many other X-first positions in philosophy&mdash\;such as reasons-first and value-first theories of normativity&mdash\;which\, I argue\, are indeed best understood as views about explanatory priority.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Bio:</strong> Adam Marushak is an Associate Researcher at South China Normal University in the Institute for Science\, Technology\, and Society\, where he has taught since 2019. He received his PhD in philosophy in 2018 from the University of Pittsburgh. His current research addresses questions in traditional epistemology through doing foundational work in metaphysics and the philosophy of language. His work has appeared in leading international journals\, including the Journal of Philosophy\, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research\, and the Journal of Philosophical Logic.</p>\n<p>The meeting time is the 27th of November\, 3pm China Standard Time.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Meeting time in other timezones:</p>\n<p>- 8am Central European Standard Time</p>\n<p>- 11pm\, Pacific Daylight Time (previous day)</p>\n<p>- 8pm\, New Zealand Standard Time</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=M R. X. Dentith:
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