Abstract: \; \;This paper is part of a broader project: to identify the methodological benefits of relatively orthodox claims about the nature of value. The paper is in part a critical response to recent unorthodox claims due to Larry Temkin. Temkin notoriously claims that it is problematic to assume that better-than is a transitive relation. He also claims that the nature of value is "essentially comparative"\, and that this undermines a number of common assumptions about value\, including the assumption of transitivity.
\n\; Two principal claims are defended. The first\, positive claim\, is that there is a non-trivial methodological benefit involved in upholding the orthodox assumption that better-than is a transitive relation. The second claim is purely negative: I show that\, even if value is essentially comparative\, that gives us no reason to think transitivity fails.
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