Various authors (e.g. Parsons (1990)\, Shapiro (2004)) have objected to dialetheists that they cannot rule things out and express disagreement: their &ldquo\;~A&rdquo\; \, or &ldquo\;A is false&rdquo\;\, does not rule out the truth of A. Priest (2006) has replied by proposing primitive rejection (not characterized as the acceptance of negation) as an exclusion-expressing device\; but \;qua \;pragmatic operator\, this has expressive limitations. Nor will arrow-falsum\, A &rarr\; \;&perp\;\, work as an exclusion-expressive device\, for it suffers from a Curry-type revenge.
\nI here present some thoughts on an exclusion-expressing device based on a primitive\, non-logical notion of exclusion between predicates\, or the corresponding properties. The idea is to have a predicative operator\, &ldquo\;#&rdquo\;\, that\, taken as input Px\, ouputs \; its minimal incompatible\, #Px (what follows from the having of some property or other incompatible with P). Given a dialetheic-friendly (say\, De Morgan) negation ~\, we want \; #Px \;⊨ \;~Px (if something is minimally incompatible with being P\, then it is not P). \; However\, ~Px \;⊭ \;#Px: x may fail to be P\, without thereby having a feature positively incompatible with P. Such an operator can be used to express exclusion\, and it is free from the most obvious revenge (the sentence saying &ldquo\;I am minimally incompatible with truth&rdquo\;). Whether it is robustly revenge-free (i.e.\, whether a non-triviality proof for a formal theory embedding a rigorous characterization of \; &ldquo\;#&rdquo\; can be given)\, I still have no idea.
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