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VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260606T074224Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20141130T050000
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20141130T063000
SUMMARY:Attitudinal Cognitive Phenomenology and the Horizon of Possibilities
UID:20260611T135811Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:America/Toronto
LOCATION:Nador utca 9\, Budapest\, Hungary\, 1051
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>ABSTRACT</strong></p>\n<p><strong></strong>In this talk I present a defence of cognitive phenomenology by focusing on two related elements: (i) the attitude component of cognitive mental episodes\, and (ii) the background knowledge and what can be called &lsquo\;the horizon of possibilities&rsquo\;. Firstly\, I examine the relation of cognitive attitudes and phenomenal character and defend the view that different kinds of cognitive attitudes exhibit different kinds of cognitive phenomenology. This view is supported by a version of the epistemic argument (Pitt 2004) applied to cognitive attitudes. Secondly\, and focusing on cases of consciously thinking a thought\, I argue that these are not isolated intentional experiences but rather we have to acknowledge holistic clusters where our previous beliefs and knowledge play a certain role in the anticipation of future experiences. I call this anticipation aspect &lsquo\;the horizon of possibilities&rsquo\; and I elaborate on what it is\, why it is experienced\, whether it is reducible or not to a temporal anticipation and\, finally\, how it contributes to cognitive phenomenology.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Katalin  Farkas;CN=David Pitt:
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