According to Hume\, &ldquo\;personal identity [&hellip\;] has become so great a question in philosophy\, especially of late years in England&rdquo\; (Treatise 1.4.6.15). It is clear that Hume&rsquo\;s theory is developed in response to Locke&rsquo\;s account of personal identity. Although Hume is clearly influenced by Locke\, it is striking that he never acknowledges Locke&rsquo\;s claim that &lsquo\;person&rsquo\; is a forensic term (Essay II.xxvii.26). It is even more striking that Hume&rsquo\;s account of the self in Books 2 and 3 of the Treatise has less scope for distinguishing persons from human beings as Locke does. This is puzzling\, because Locke originally introduced the distinction in order to answer questions of moral accountability and Hume&rsquo\;s discussion of the self in Book 2 provides the foundation of his moral theory in Book 3. The aim of the paper is to explain why Hume neglects the moral dimension of Locke&rsquo\;s theory. I will propose the following hypothesis in response to the puzzle: Accounts of persons and personal identity over time vary depending on the underlying moral\, religious and metaphysical background assumptions. I will show how this hypothesis solves the puzzle by drawing attention to important moral and religious differences that shape Locke&rsquo\;s and Hume&rsquo\;s thinking about personal identity. \;
\nRuth Boeker received her PhD from the University of St Andrews in 2013 and held positions at Bowling Green State University and at the University at Albany\, SUNY\, before moving to the University of Melbourne in 2014. Her research focuses on theories of the self and personal identity in early modern philosophy and investigates how moral\, religious and metaphysical background assumptions affect theories of the self and personal identity. Her paper &ldquo\;The Moral Dimension in Locke&rsquo\;s Account of Persons and Personal Identity&rdquo\; was published by History of Philosophy Quarterly in 2014.
ORGANIZER;CN=Sean Bowden: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR