Immanent critique is ubiquitous in continental philosophy. However\, there is little common ground concerning \;how \;immanent critique operates\, or \;what \;philosophical commitments it entails. \; \;I aim to address these lacunae\, arguing that the three desiderata of critical social theory commit theorists to &lsquo\;immanent critique.&rsquo\; I then spell out some of immanent critique&rsquo\;s basic features by contrasting it with more recognizable argumentative or interpretative strategies. This yields three requirements: (i) an \;inherence requirement\, which specifies the manner in which normative content is said to be internal to or implicit in a given practice\, (ii) a \;contradiction requirement\, which specifies how practice and commitment are supposed to fit such that \;failure of fit \;has motivational import\, and (iii) an \;access requirement\, which specifies how social critics can successfully identify the relevant normative content without simply imputing it.
\nAlexei Procyshyn \;is lecturer in contemporary European philosophy and critical theory at Monash University. He received his PhD from the New School for Social Research in 2013. Before coming to Monash\, he was a post-doctoral fellow in the Philosophy and Religious Studies Programme at the University of Macau. He is currently working on two projects\, one a reconstruction of Walter Benjamin&rsquo\;s implicit philosophy of presentation and the other on the metaphysical and epistemological commitments of &lsquo\;immanent critique.&rsquo\; He is interested in the parameters of failure and achievement for social action and Neo-Kantian approaches to meaning and value.
ORGANIZER;CN=Sean Bowden: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR