BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260605T001927Z DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20150506T120000 DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20150506T140000 SUMMARY:The same old debate: has there been any progress in the debate around mental representations? UID:20260606T204029Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm TZID:Australia/Melbourne LOCATION:La Trobe University\, Melbourne\, Australia DESCRIPTION:

On close examination\, the debate between those in favour of mental representations and those against appears to have made little progress. One philosopher acutely aware of this was Peter Slezak\, who\, in a series of articles (Slezak 1999\, 2002\, 2004)\, drew parallels between today&rsquo\;s\, cognitive science based\, debate to the one held between Nicolas Malebranche and Antoine Arnauld in the 17th Century. Tracking the similarities from Malebranche\, to Locke\, to Jerry Fodor\, Slezak shows how the same problems and the same replies come up again and again. This talk will explore these similarities with a focus on the two conflicting models at the heart of this debate: the tripartite model that supports representations (object\, representation\, mind) versus the dyadic one suggested by anti-representationalists (world\, mind). I will contend that it is only by understanding the debate on these terms we can hope to avoid the mistakes of the past. Additionally\, this approach allows us to see the level of flexibility afforded by the dyadic approach\; a level of flexibility that at least hints at how new approaches could emerge and provide new insight to this long-standing debate.

ORGANIZER;CN=Aaron Harrison: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR