BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261001T073849Z DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20150527T120000 DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20150527T140000 SUMMARY:Overly enactive imagination? Imagining the unimaginable? UID:20261005T212754Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:d4d9:c3ff:fe86:f658%3 TZID:Australia/Melbourne LOCATION:La Trobe University\, Melbourne\, Australia DESCRIPTION:

Is  \;contentless imagining imaginable? Some think not: Others think not\, necessarily. A certain philosophical frame of mind holds that contentless imaginings are not just difficult or hard to imagine &ndash\; they are plainly unimaginable\, &ldquo\;inconceivable&rdquo\; (Shapiro 2014a\, p. 214): it is simply not possible to imagine acts of imagining in the absence of content. This conclusion is sometimes presented as if it were analytic: guaranteed by few self-evident truths about cognition: (1) All cognition involves content\, necessarily\; (2) All imaginings are forms of cognition\; thus (3) All imaginings involve content. If (1) is a sufficiently strong conceptual truth about cognition then this would explain why\, in virtue of their cognitive status\, it is simply inconceivable that imaginings might lack content.  \;If (1) holds it is simply incoherent to think otherwise and any attempted suggestion to the contrary is not just false\, it is utter nonsense: an ill-formed attempt to deny &ldquo\;the undeniable&rdquo\; (Shapiro 2014a\, p. 214). Using the imagination as a critical test case of the tenability of a radically non-representational enactivism\, this presentation will show that the assumption that imagination is contentful is neither needed nor attractive when it comes to answering substantial  \;explanatory questions about how imaginings perform their most fundamental roles in our cognitive lives.

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