Scientific Naturalism is a widely popular position in contemporary metaphysics. Naturalists of this stripe are centrally concerned with what has come to be called &ldquo\;the placement problem&rdquo\;: how do we find a &ldquo\;place&rdquo\; for\, e.g.\, mind\, meaning\, and morals\, in the scientific image of the world? In this talk I mean to argue &ndash\; on the basis of distinguishing theoretical and practical versions of the scientific image &ndash\; that this problem is misconceived even from within the perspective of scientific naturalism. The default position for naturalism is not Scientific Naturalism but a Liberal Naturalism which opens up the hitherto neglected realm of non-supernatural non-scientific entities. This realm arguably includes those things that are presupposed in the practice of science\, e.g.\, people (scientists)\, artifacts (e.g. tables) and meaningful communication (e.g. scientific conferences &\; journals). The claim that these things are non-scientific depends on the idea that the correct deployment of the relevant concepts constitutively depends on what &ldquo\;we&rdquo\; take-as instances of such things as fellow speakers within a linguistic community. Liberal Naturalism thus opens up into a philosophical exploration of interpersonal space or what we might call 2nd-personal realm.
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David Macarthur is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney. \; His philosophical interests are wide-ranging. \; He has written articles on scepticism\, pragmatism\, metaphysical quietism\, the meaning of naturalism\, Wittgenstein\, and philosophy of art and architecture.