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DTSTAMP:20260605T032628Z
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Tokyo:20150730T100000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Tokyo:20150730T130000
SUMMARY:After all\, what is disjunctivism?
UID:20260607T001318Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Asia/Tokyo
LOCATION:Conference Hall\, the meeting room 5?????????????\, Sapporo\, Japan
DESCRIPTION:<p>International Workshop</p>\n\n<p>After all\, what is Disjunctivism?</p>\n\n\n\n<p>The term &ldquo\;disjunctivism&rdquo\; was originally introduced in philosophy of perception but has more recently been employed in other areas of philosophy in particular in philosophy of action. Disjunctive accounts of perception are highly contested and there is no one understanding of what disjunctivism amounts to amongst its proponents. Why then should we think a disjunctivist approach could and should be employed in other areas of philosophy? The disjunctive approach to perception could seem to be either trivially true or obviously false. If it merely claims that successful perception and hallucination are significantly distinct in that we can see an environmental object only in the former case\, it seems trivially true. If it claims that there is nothing in common between hallucination and successful perceptions\, it seems obviously false. Surely something must be in common. So what exactly is the claim of the disjunctivist? To answer such questions we need to become clear on the nature of problems that motivated disjunctivism in the first place. </p>\n\n<p>The aim of this workshop is to clarify the motivation for disjunctivism and to identify the most fundamental disputes concerning the position. Solving this task would help us evaluate the potential of employing a disjunctive approach to problems in other areas of philosophy\, in particular in philosophy of action. Our basic question is: What could the common nature between problems in philosophy of perception and problems in philosophy of action be\, such that a transfer of the disjunctive approach to the area of action could so much as look promising? </p>\n\n\n\n<p>Date: 30th July 2015.</p>\n\n<p>Place: Hokkaido University (Conference Hall\, the meeting room 5?????????????<a name="_GoBack"></a>)</p>\n\n<p>Speakers: </p>\n\n<p>Yudai Suzuki (Sensyu University)</p>\n\n<p>Takuya Niikawa (Chiba University / Hokkaido University)</p>\n\n<p>Rasmus Jensen (The University of Tokyo) </p>\n\n\n\n<p>Tentative Program:</p>\n\n\n\n<p>14:00 Yudai Suzuki\, &ldquo\;Some Versions of Disjunctive Accounts of Reasons for Action&rdquo\;</p>\n\n<p>15:00 break</p>\n\n<p>15:10 Takuya Niikawa\, &ldquo\;What is the point of disjunctivism about perceptual experience?&rdquo\;</p>\n\n<p>16:10 break </p>\n\n<p>16:20 Rasmus Jensen\, &ldquo\;Do we need a disjunctive account of bodily movements?&rdquo\; </p>\n\n<p>17:20 break </p>\n\n<p>17:30 General Discussion</p>\n\n<p>18:30 Dinner</p>\n\n\n\n<p>Contact Person:</p>\n\n<p>Takuya Niikawa (<a href="mailto:niitaku11@yahoo.co.jp">niitaku11@yahoo.co.jp</a>)</p>\n\n\n\n<p>You do not have to register for this workshop. It will be our pleasure to welcome your attendance. </p>\n
ORGANIZER;CN=Rasmus Thybo Jensen;CN=Niikawa Takuya:
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