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PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260620T230545Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20150918T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20150918T153000
SUMMARY:Semantic and Intentional Content
UID:20260622T130952Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/London
LOCATION:Sidgwick Avenue\, Cambridge\, United Kingdom\, CB3 9DA
DESCRIPTION:<p>Abstract:</p>\n<p>Standard accounts of the semantics of intentional state attributions typically treat such attributions as relating subjects of states to abstract entities of some kind (e.g. propositions\, intensions etc.). Many philosophers have used such semantic models in their attempts to understand intentionality: intentional content is conceived of as semantic content. In this talk I will argue that this way of thinking about intentional content distorts phenomenology and makes intentional theories of consciousness hard to understand. I will sketch an alternative conception of intentional content that does not rely on the semantic model.</p>\n<p>http://www.newdirectionsproject.com</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Minyao Huang;CN=Kasia Jaszczolt;CN=Luca Sbordone:
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