BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260501T203458Z DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20151106T090000 DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20151106T110000 SUMMARY:Begging to differ with similarity accounts of counterfactuals UID:20260505T183307Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq TZID:Australia/Melbourne LOCATION:Monash University\, Clayton\, Australia\, 3800 DESCRIPTION:

Widespread agreement among philosophers on a given topic is rare. However\, it is enjoyed by the Stalnaker/Lewis similarity accounts of counterfactuals. Roughly\, they say that the counterfactual

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if \;p \;were the case\, \;q \;would be the case

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is true if and only if

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at the \;nearest \;p-worlds\, \;q \;is true.

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I disagree with these accounts\, for many reasons. A recurring problem is that they render true various implausibly specific counterfactuals. \;I suggest an alternative proposal for the right-hand side:

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at the \;sufficiently near \;p-worlds\, \;q \;is true.

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Reading to complete in advance: David Lewis\, &ldquo\;Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow\,&rdquo\; \;Nous \;13 (1979): 455-76.

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