BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260605T074421Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20151110T123000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20151111T120000
SUMMARY:World in Mind
UID:20260607T153524Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/London
LOCATION:Senate House Malet Street\, London\, United Kingdom\, WC1E7HU
DESCRIPTION:<p>Speakers Abstract:</p>\n<p>I will begin by sketching a view according to which perceptual phenomenal character is &lsquo\;extended&rsquo\;\, in the sense of literally incorporating mind-independent entities in the subject&rsquo\;s environment (a view also known as Naive Realism or the Relational View). I will then argue that this metaphysical thesis about perceptual phenomenal character affords a novel version of epistemological disjunctivism\, which is the view that a veridically perceiving subject is in a better epistemic position than a counterpart suffering an indistinguishable illusion or hallucination. I will conclude by comparing this view with other versions of epistemological disjunctivism\, and I will suggest that the one I've offered comes as close as we possibly can to convincing the external world sceptic.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Corine  Besson:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR