Detailed Program:
\n\n9.30 - 10.45: Pierre Jacob (IJN)\, "Vicarious Pain: Imagination\, Mirroring or Perception?"
\nAmong possible vicarious experiences\, I will concentrate on the experience of vicarious pain\, \;whereby one shares another's standard pain. I will argue for an-imagination-based account of \;vicarious pain. Then I will critically examine two prominent rival accounts: the mirroring based account \;and the perception-based account.
\n\n10.45 - 11.00: Coffee break
\n\n11.00 - 12.15: Franç\;ois Ré\;canati (IJN)\, "Vicarious Mental Files"
\n\nMental files are primarily singular terms in the language of thought : they serve to think about \;objects in the world. But they have a derived\, metarepresentational function : they serve to \;represent how other subjects think about objects in the world. To account for the metarepresentational use of files I will introduce the notion of an &bdquo\;indexed file‟\, i.e. a file that \;stands\, in the subject‟s mind\, for another subject‟s file about an object. Indexed files\, I will \;argue\, are a simulative device: by deploying a mental file just like the file in the mind of the \;indexed person\, one puts oneself in the other person‟s shoes (or frame of mind)\, by looking at things her way. In the talk I will present the essentials of the theory and\, time permitting\, I will provide an analysis of attitude ascriptions and other phenomena in terms of indexed files.
\n\n12.15 - 14.00: Lunch break
\n\n14.00 - 15.15: Fré\;dé\;rique de Vignemont (IJN)\, "Feeling Another's Tactile Sensations" Through empathy\, one can share another person's affective states\, including pain. But what \;about sensory states\, and in particular\, tactile experiences with no affective dimension? Can \;they be shared? It has been recently found that some individuals report feeling touch on their \;own body when they see other people being touched. I shall review here several possible \;interpretations of this phenomenon\, which is\, on my view\, misleadingly labelled as visuotactile synaesthesia. \;In particular\, I will explore the following hypothesis: what can be shared \;between self and other is not tactile experience itself\, but the representation of the body that is \;used as reference frame for tactile experience.
\n\n15.15 - 15.30: Coffee break
\n\n15.30 - 16.45: Jé\;rô\;me Dokic (IJN)\, "Subjective and Quasi De Se Imagination"
\nThe topic of this talk is what Vendler called &ldquo\;subjective imagination&rdquo\;\, which consists in \;imagining actions and emotions &ldquo\;from the inside&rdquo\;\, as opposed to imagining them &ldquo\;from \;outside&rdquo\;\, and what Recanati calls &ldquo\;quasi de se imagination&rdquo\;\, namely the type of mental state \;one is in when one imagines\, for instance\, being Rudolf Lingens. I will put forward an \;analysis of subjective and quasi de se imagination within the framework of Currie and \;Ravenscroft‟s recreative account of imagination. In particular\, I shall argue that subjective \;imagination involves the recreation of introspective or metacognitive experiences (about our \;own actions and emotions). Since the relevant experiences fall short of explicit selfascriptions\, \;one can recreate them without recreating any explicit self-ascription. This is what \;makes certain forms of subjective and quasi de se imagination possible.
\n\n16.45 - 17.00: Coffee Break
\n\n17.00 - 18.15: Alvin Goldman (Rutgers\, The State University of New Jersey)\, "Mindreading \;by Simulation: The Roles of Imagination and Mirroring"
\nThe general contours of the simulation approach to mindreading were laid down in the last \;twenty-five years. I will first present a sketch of the simulation view\, starting with the original \;model -- addressed to the mindreading of propositional attitudes -- and proceeding to a later \;variant that addresses emotions\, bodily sensations\, and intentional motion. Then I will \;explore more recent and novel findings that are especially pertinent to simulation theory. Finally\, I will argue that simulation theory is fully consistent with up-to-date views on the \;neural bases of theory of mind and evolutionary perspectives on mindreading.
\n\nContact: joulia.smortchkova@gmail.com
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