Attendance at this event is by invitation only. If you would like to attend\, please contact the organizers.
\nAbstract:
\nThe claim that we see facts &ndash\; understood as actual states of affairs &ndash\; is widely shared among philosophers of perception. Let us call this claim &lsquo\;factualism&rsquo\;. Factualism seems to imply three theses: that we see properties\, that we see objects\, and that we perceptually ascribe such properties to objects. Allegedly\, factualism would be supported by experimental evidence on object perception. In this study\, I challenge factualism from a phenomenological standpoint. After clarifying the relevant notion of &lsquo\;seeing&rsquo\; linking it with the phenomenal sense of look\, I will examine both claims that we see properties and objects. I will then elaborate on the interpretation of two visual phenomena\, the phi-phenomenon and experiments involving object tracking through feature-space\, which would lend support to factualism. It is my contention that visual objects should be understood as organized constellations of properties\, rather than entities belonging to a different ontological category. This reading\, it is argued\, undermines factualism about visual perception.
ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR