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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260604T152849Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20160311T040000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20160312T120000
SUMMARY:Varieties of Self-knowledge 
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TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION:The Barker Center \, Cambridge\, United States\, 02138
DESCRIPTION:<p>The workshop aims to bring together philosophers who have worked on the topic of self-knowledge from diverse standpoints to&nbsp\;discuss what varieties of self-knowledge are worth distinguishing and how they might matter to a characteristically human life. &nbsp\;Questions about the epistemic basis of self-knowledge\, and the extent to which we humans possess it\, will undoubtedly play a part in the discussion\, but our primary goal is not so much to adjudicate these issues as to consider such questions as the following:</p>\n<p>&bull\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; What should be our attitude toward the famous Delphic injunction to &ldquo\;know thyself&rdquo\;? &nbsp\;Are there forms of self-knowledge&nbsp\;that are crucial to a successful human life? &nbsp\;Are there ways in which self-knowledge might be an obstacle to our lives? &nbsp\;</p>\n<p>&bull\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; What connection is there\, if any\, between rationality and self-knowledge? &nbsp\;Does rationality entail some capacity for&nbsp\;privileged self-knowledge? &nbsp\;Is some form of self-knowledge necessary for rationality?</p>\n<p>&bull\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; What is the relationship between self-knowledge and self-consciousness? &nbsp\;Must a subject who is capable of thinking of&nbsp\;herself first personally (or having "de se" representations of herself) be capable of certain forms of self-knowledge? &nbsp\;What&nbsp\;forms of self-awareness should we distinguish\, and what relations of dependency (if any) hold between them?&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>&bull\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; &nbsp\;What difference of principle (if any) does our capacity for self-knowledge make to our cognitive capacities in general? &nbsp\;Is&nbsp\;self-knowledge just more knowledge\, potentially useful in the way that any knowledge might be\, or does our capacity for&nbsp\;some form of self-knowledge transform our very capacity to know in some important way?</p>\n<p>&bull\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; What might it mean to speak of a &ldquo\;first person perspective&rdquo\; on mind\, and how might a consideration of that perspective be&nbsp\;important to the philosophy of mind? &nbsp\;</p>\n<p>&bull\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; How (if at all) are capacities for self-awareness drawn on in more specific forms of human activity such as: intentional&nbsp\;action\, contentful communication\, understanding and interacting with other people\, etc.?</p>\n<p>This will be a read-in-advance workshop.&nbsp\; Papers will be pre-circulated\, and <em>will not be presented in full</em>.&nbsp\; To register for the workshop and receive access to the papers\, please email Olivia Bailey at obailey@fas.harvard.edu</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Matthew Boyle;CN=Richard Moran:
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