Carnap (1956 [1950]) distinguishes between questions that are \;internal \;and questions that are \;external \;to a framework. He says that internal questions are either empirical or analytic (p. 214)\, while external questions are meaningless (p. 207). The question driving this essay is this: what kind of mistake is involved in external questions\, so that they are meaningless?
\nI argue for a relativist interpretation of Carnap&rsquo\;s internal/external distinction. In this interpretation\, Carnap thought that existence is relative to a framework\, and that what exists varies between frameworks. Internal questions then are ones asking whether something exists relative to a specific framework. These relative questions\, for Carnap\, are meaningful. But external questions ask whether something exists\, not relative to this or that framework\, but absolutely speaking. These non-relative questions\, for Carnap\, are meaningless. Relativist interpretations contrast \;with \;language pluralist \;interpretations\, according to which not what there is but only the meaning of \;&lsquo\;exists&rsquo\; \;(and of related terms) varies between frameworks. \;
\nMy argument is this. Carnap introduced the internal/external distinction in order to provide a criterion for when empirically unverifiable existence claims are admissible. The internal/external distinction does provide such a criterion\, however only assuming its relativist interpretation. This argument has consequences for the proper understanding of Carnap\, and also for assessing Carnap&rsquo\;s legacy for contemporary metaontology.
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