In the Preface of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus\, Wittgenstein writes that &ldquo\;the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought\, or rather &ndash\; not to thought\, but to the expression thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought\, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable&rdquo\; (TLP 3). The notion of a limit of language surfaces numerous times in the Tractatus\, and it is not absent from Wittgenstein&rsquo\;s later work either. In 1931\, Wittgenstein connects the idea of a limit of language to the &ldquo\;Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy&rdquo\; (CV 13). In Philosophical Grammar we find him stating that &ldquo\;The links of the chain of reasons come to an end\, at the boundary of the game&rdquo\; (PG 97). In the Philosophical Investigations\, Wittgenstein mentions the &ldquo\;bumps that the understanding has got by running up against the limits of language&rdquo\; (PI §\; 119). How should we interpret these and other references to the limits of language in Wittgenstein&rsquo\;s published and unpublished manuscripts? What is the relation between Wittgenstein&rsquo\;s early and later use of the notion of the limits of language? What would it mean to overcome those limits? The purpose of this two-day conference is to provide a platform for Wittgenstein scholars to discuss these and related themes in Wittgenstein&rsquo\;s work.
\nFor further information\, please contact Hanne Appelqvist: hanne.appelqvist[at]helsinki.fi.
ORGANIZER;CN=Hanne Appelqvist;CN="Sami Pihlström";CN="Panu-Matti Pöykkö": METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR