Spinoza&rsquo\;s account of the mind in the Short Treatise differs significantly from that in the Ethics. One claim that remains constant\, however\, is that the mind is an idea (more specifically: an idea of the body). After considering the significance of this counter-intuitive claim\, I examine Spinoza&rsquo\;s argument for it in the Short Treatise. This examination suggests that Spinoza&rsquo\;s grounds for accepting the mind-as-idea view must extend beyond those he explicitly offers. I conclude with a proposal about what Spinoza&rsquo\;s actual grounds were\, and give some reasons for thinking that the view is more plausible than it first appears.
\n\nColin Marshall is Gerry Higgins Lecturer in the History of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne. He is the author of a number articles on Spinoza and Kant in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research\, Philosopher&rsquo\;s Imprint and the British Journal for the History of Philosophy.
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