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PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260718T075710Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20160512T121500
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20160512T141500
SUMMARY:Two arguments against epistemic infinitism
UID:20260718T143843Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:74d0:1ff:feb1:3c52%3
TZID:Australia/Melbourne
LOCATION:Old Physics Building\, Melbourne\, Australia
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Abstract</strong></p>\n<p>Epistemic infinitists (Peter Klein\, Scott Aikin and others) reject foundationalism and coherentism\, and claim that the justification of a proposition derives from its heading an infinitely long chain of reasons\, each member of which provides justification for its successor. In this paper I present two reductio arguments against infinitism. A first reductio is to the effect that infinitism has the consequence that no one would ever have doxastic justification in any belief. The second and more important reductio is a long-standing objection to infinitism. This is the objection that if infinitism were true\, no proposition would ever be propositionally justified for anyone. I restate and try to sharpen this objection\, and argue that various attempts to rebut it have completely failed.</p>
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