Theories of global justice mostly emphasize individual moral agency in dealing with injustice. \;Collective agents are then treated as being instrumental to individuals discharging their moral \;duties. However\, this view seems impoverished\, for it does not capture well the distinctive nature \;of collective agents\; more and more voices argue that certain collectives are in fact moral agents.
\nIn their seminal work\, List and Pettit argue that group agents\, by virtue of being structured and \;having the capacity to form joint intentions\, can be considered moral agents (List and Pettit\, \;2011). Therefore\, the concept of moral agency has been extended to structured group agents. \;This workshop seeks to explore normative implications of the concept of collective moral agency \;in the context of global injustice. We invite submissions that could help to answer the following \;questions:
\nFirst and foremost\, in what sense are collectives moral agents\, i.e. what are the relevant \;properties that an agent has to possess in order to be considered a moral agent? Does \;consciousness play any role?
\nIf recognition of moral agency of collectives does not tell us anything about their moral \;responsibility\, how do we assign such moral responsibility to particular collective moral agents? \;What are the consequences for individual moral responsibility once we accept that groups can be \;held morally responsible?
\nIf certain collectives can be held morally responsible\, should we also recognize their equal \;rights? If so\, how does this relate to individual rights? \;If agency is crucial for assigning moral duties\, what does this tell us about moral responsibilities \;of \; unstructured collectives? Are they to be considered moral agents? If not\, who is to blame for \;a collective harm of unstructured groups?
\nDoes a potential agency have any moral relevance? For instance\, the international community is \;often seen as an agent. Is this view conceptually defensible? \;Does the existence of \;collective moral agents entail the existence of collective moral patients? As \;they are comprised of individual moral agents\, it seems that such collectives hold a potential to \;become full-fledged moral agents. Do we have a duty to transform such moral patients into \;moral agents when capacities exist and they would further the interests of their individual \;members? Practice offers a plethora of agency-enhancing actions\, such as establishing temporary \;international protectorates \;or providing aid upon condition that \; a recipient respects human \;rights. \;In what sense are these actions agency-enhancing\, if at all?
\nHow do collective moral agents relate to one another? Who counts as a moral agent in the case of \;transnational and international organizations?
\nHow can we conceptualize &ldquo\;nested&rdquo\; moral agency &ndash\; when one collective moral agent consists of \;collective\, rather than individual members? Can we consider the UN or the EU a moral agent\, or \;does moral agency remain with their member states? Who is more morally relevant?
\nFormat:
\nPlease submit your abstract (300-500 words) prepared for blind-review by Friday\, 20th May \;2016. We will expect final papers to be sent to us by Mid-August\, so that we can pre-circulate it \;among the workshop participants. For abstract submission and further information\, please write \;to: belic_jelena@phd.ceu.edu and bozac_zlata@phd.ceu.edu
\nWe look forward to submissions!
ORGANIZER;CN=Jelena Belic;CN=Zlata Bozac: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR