Our understanding of the world is mediated through explanations. I&rsquo\;m in pain because I just kicked the table leg. The artwork is beautiful because the artist is very talented. But these somewhat familiar causal/scientific explanations are not the only kinds of explanation we give. My being in pain may also be explained with reference to my being in a particular brain state and the artwork s beauty can be explained in terms of its composition. These are so-called metaphysical explanations which\, rather than explaining a certain effect with reference to its cause\, take you from what is less to what is more fundamental\; from what depends for its existence on something else\, to that on which its existence is grounded. It is a kind of explanation you find both in- and outside of philosophy\, yet which has received surprisingly little attention in the literature. As a consequence\, it is a kind of explanation which nature and application is relatively speaking ill-understood\, a circumstance which threatens its justified use in theory evaluation and theory comparison. This conference aims to (start to) rectify this unfortunate situation by thoroughly investigating the nature of metaphysical explanation\, thereby hopefully securing it well-justified use in both philosophical and scientific practice.
\nParticipation is free\, but we would appreciate it if you could let us know you intend to attend by sendin an e-mail to: anna-sofia.maurin@gu.se
ORGANIZER;CN=Anna-Sofia Maurin: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR