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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260512T204314Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20160609T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20160610T130000
SUMMARY:Reasons and Mental States in Decision Theory
UID:20260514T115031Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq
TZID:Europe/London
LOCATION:Houghton Street\, London\, United Kingdom\, WC2A 2AE
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong><u>Reasons and Mental States in Decision Theory</u></strong></p>\n<p>LSE Choice Group Workshop</p>\n<p>June 9th and 10th\, 2016</p>\n<p>London School of Economics\, Lakatos Building\, LAK.206</p>\n<p>Traditionally\, decision theory &ndash\; especially in economics and the social sciences &ndash\; has been behaviouristic. Decision theorists have tended to avoid references to a decision-maker&rsquo\;s mental states and to interpret preferences and beliefs merely as formal constructs representing the decision-maker&rsquo\;s observable behaviour. In recent years\, however\, there has been a psychological turn in decision theory. Many studies &ndash\; going back to the pioneering works of Herbert Simon\, Daniel Kahneman\, Amos Tversky\, and others &ndash\; have shown that\, as a positive theory\, traditional decision theory does not adequately explain human choice behaviour. This observation\, in turn\, has motivated a quest for more psychologically informed models of decision-making. Furthermore\, the observation that real choice behaviour is more complicated than suggested by classical decision theory raises the question of what the right normative theory of decision-making is. The aim of this workshop is to explore whether\, and how\, we can make progress in decision theory by modelling a decision-maker&rsquo\;s reasons and/or mental states. The workshop theme will be broadly construed\, and the workshop topics will include both positive and normative aspects of decision-making.</p>\n<p><strong><u><br></u></strong></p>\n<p><strong><u>Preliminary&nbsp\;programme</u></strong></p>\n<p><strong><u>Thursday\, 9th</u> June 2016</strong></p>\n<p>14:15 &ndash\; 15:15 &ldquo\;Welcome and Introduction to the Topic&rdquo\;\, Christian List (LSE)</p>\n<p>15:30 &ndash\; 16:30 &ldquo\;Arguments for probabilism&rdquo\;\, Anna Mahtani (LSE)</p>\n<p>16:45 &ndash\; 17:45 &ldquo\;Is well-being measurable after all?&rdquo\;\, Anna Alexandrova (University of Cambridge)</p>\n<p>18:00 &ndash\; 19:00 &ldquo\;Don't look before you leap&rdquo\;\, Arif Ahmed (University of Cambridge)</p>\n<p><strong><u>Friday\, 10th</u> June 2016</strong></p>\n<p>9:30 &ndash\; 10:30 TBA\, Natalie Gold (King&rsquo\;s College\, London)</p>\n<p>10:45 &ndash\; 11:45 &ldquo\;Categorical decision theory&rdquo\;\, Marcus Pivato (Universit&eacute\; de Cergy-Pontoise)</p>\n<p>12:00 &ndash\; 13:00 &ldquo\;Coarse\, efficient decision-making&rdquo\;\, Michael Mandler (Royal Holloway\, University of London)</p>\n<p>14:15 &ndash\; 15:15 &ldquo\;Psychology of decision-making: Neither harm nor good?&rdquo\;\, Magda Osman (Queen Mary\, University of London)</p>\n<p>15:30 &ndash\; 16:30 &ldquo\;Reason-based choice&rdquo\;\, Franz Dietrich (CNRS / Paris School of Economics)</p>\n<p>16:45 &ndash\; 17:45 &ldquo\;Independent reasons&rdquo\;\, Itai Sher (University of California\, San Diego)</p>\n<p>18:00 &ndash\; 19:00 &ldquo\;Risk as reason&rdquo\;\, Richard Bradley (LSE)</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Christian List:
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