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VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260516T114036Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20160601T100000
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20160601T120000
SUMMARY: "Moral Enhancement\, Autonomy\, and Resistance"
UID:20260522T015220Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq
TZID:Australia/Melbourne
LOCATION:Monash University\, Clayton\, Australia\, 3800
DESCRIPTION:<p>Abstract: Moral enhancement is a type of enhancement that aims to improve morality. Traditionally the improvement of morality has been promoted with moral education and other non-biochemical means. But recently\, Persson and Savulescu (2012) have argued that we should also consider using biochemicals to modulate our moral dispositions\, such as altruism\, empathy\, and a sense of justice. In response to this proposal\, Harris (2011) argues that this type of moral bioenhancement will seriously harm our freedom to make wrongful choices and subsequently transform us from moral agents to non-moral agents. <br><br>In this paper\, I argue that Harris is correct in pointing out the potential harm on freedom Persson and Savulescu&rsquo\;s proposal may bring to their enhancement recipients\, yet the freedom that should be protected is not the freedom to make wrongful choices\, as he suggests. Rather\, it is the freedom to be self-determined that should be defended. I use Harry Frankfurt&rsquo\;s analysis of moral responsibility to argue that freedom to make wrongful choices is not essential for moral agency. I further argue that if the freedom to make wrongful choicse is essential to moral agency\, then any type of moral enhancement\, including education\, should be seen as a threat to moral agency\, which is absurd. I argue that the worrisome feature of Persson and Savulescu&rsquo\;s moral bioenhancement is its power to alter individuals&rsquo\; decision-making in moral issues and its affective nature. The alteration means the &lsquo\;enhanced&rsquo\; may not be morally responsible for their behaviour. The affective nature further makes the alteration irresistible by bypassing rational scrutiny. Both are detrimental to self-governance and moral agency.&nbsp\; Based on this criticism\, I argue that moral education is right to be considered as an acceptable form of moral enhancement because the engagement of rational faculties is indispensable and because it allows the educated to resist and even reform moral values it tries to promote.</p>
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