BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260606T215456Z DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20161118T103000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20161118T123000 SUMMARY:Factive and non-factive mental state attribution UID:20260613T135256Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm TZID:America/New_York LOCATION:32 Vassar Street\, Cambridge\, United States DESCRIPTION:

ABSTRACT: Unlike states of knowledge\, states of belief can diverge from reality. This divergence can be interestingly predict­\;able: humans have natural capacities to anticipate the false beliefs that other agents naturally have in a variety of situations. However\, even in the simple situations probed by classic tests of false belief attribution\, calculating the contents of the misled agent&rsquo\;s beliefs is a non-trivial task. To explain how we instinctively manage this task\, researchers have directed tremendous energy to figuring out what is special about reality-incongruent or counterfactual states\, in contrast to reality-congruent or accurate states of mind. This article argues that a better line of contrast runs between factive states\, such as knowing or being aware\, which can only link an agent to the truth\, and non-factive states such as believing or thinking\, which can link an agent to either truth or falsehood. After reviewing salient linguistic and functional features of this contrast\, I apply these features to the problem of calculating belief contents\, aiming to show how it is that attributions of the non-factive state of belief are initially launched\, and subsequently guided by\, attributions of factive mental states.

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