BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260605T122125Z DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20160826T100000 DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20160826T120000 SUMMARY:A Theory of Parenthood UID:20260608T092530Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm TZID:Australia/Melbourne LOCATION:Monash University\, Clayton\, Australia\, 3800 DESCRIPTION:Abstract\n \;\n \;\nDetermining who the parents are of a particular child \;has been thought to depend on identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for parenthood\, and from there assessing the extent to which a given individual meets those conditions in a specific context. There are a number of seemingly plausible contenders for these conditions\, including: genetics\, gestation\, causation and intention. Some\, like Bayne &\; Kolers (2003)\, \;endorse a pluralistic view\, where \;each of these conditions \;are \;thought to be \;(sometimes) sufficient. \;In this article\, I identify important shortcomings of this general approach to conceptualizing parenthood. The major limitation of these standard conditions is that one can be a ('natural' or 'social') parent without meeting any of them (and thus none of them are necessary)\, and someone that meets all of them can sometimes not be a parent (and thus they are not sufficient\, \;either). I develop an account of parenthood that emphasizes the \;conditions for bringing a new life into existence of which someone can be a parent (i.e. contribution of biogenetic material\, gestational environment\, and volitional participation)\, and the legitimate maintenance or transferal of parental claims. I argue that this way of understanding (natural and social) parenthood is promising since: (a) it does not rely on intuition about parenthood at its foundation\, (b) it can explain how standard sufficiency conditions ought to be ranked in particular cases\, even when none of the \;agents that meet different sufficient conditions have behaved immorally (something Bayne &\; Kolers' view cannot do)\, and (c) it can explain parenthood in especially tricky cases\, where standard accounts are implausible or uninformative (e.g. cases of women gestating their own grandchildren). I also discuss some \;interesting implications of this account: (1) some children that have \;a mother and a father can also be parentless\, (2) all parenthood is essentially contractual (and thus all parenthood is \;to \;some extent 'social' parenthood)\, (3) post-conception\, pre-natal parenthood is possible (but not automatic)\, (4) clinical embryologists that assist others in reproduction can (sometimes) be parents to the resulting children\, and (5) \;there is good reason to allow more than two spaces for listed parents on birth certificates (as some countries have been allowing). ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR