It has been proposed that the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes turn on a phenomenon of indefinite extensibility\, whereby certain notions cannot be associated with a definite totality since this would contradictorily allow an even larger such totality to be defined. For example\, there may be no definite totality of sets\, ordinal numbers\, or propositions. But how is indefinite extensibility best characterized? And how does it relate to absolute generality? Does indefinite extensibility provide any reason to revise classical logic? Does it motivate a contextualist or dynamic logical framework? This workshop aims to bring together experts in the field to address these and other questions about the nature of indefinite extensibility and its role in the paradoxes. This will be a joint workshop between the Foundations of Logical Consequence project at St Andrews and the Plurals\, Predicates and Paradox project at Birkbeck College London. Talks will start mid-day on the 2nd and end mid-day on the 4th.
\nRegistration is free.
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