In the last decades\, empirical research on human behaviour has become more \;and more relevant in public policy debates. Neuro-sciences have opened \;technological opportunities such as &lsquo\;human enhancement&rsquo\; which challenge \;common sense ideas of individual autonomy. In legal scholarship\, \;interdisciplinary approaches such as empirical legal studies and behavioural \;law and economics gain popularity on both sides of the Atlantic. These \;tendencies suggest more reliance on empirical methods and more focus on the \;actual processes of human cognition and decision-making in legally relevant \;contexts. Still\, actual legal rules and doctrines seem to resist an easy \;import of these insights.
Is there indeed such a resistance? What are the reasons for it? Is it simply \;ignorance and laziness of policymakers\, legal officials or scholars? Are the \;reasons more related to doctrinal structures\, institutional features or \;normative foundations of modern legal systems? To what extent is the law's \;model of the world based on empirical knowledge\, on common sense or on \;something else? Is there a fundamental discrepancy between what we think to \;know from science and "how the law thinks"? Should there be?
In this workshop lawyers\, philosophers\, economists\, psychologists and other \;scientists will contribute to the discussion of these questions. The goal is \;the have a genuinely interdisciplinary workshop where contributors are \;willing to confront different perspectives and engage in self-reflection \;about their own discipline(s). Various approaches are possible. For \;instance\, experimental researchers can discuss the methodological and \;substantive problems related to drawing legally relevant policy conclusions \;from empirical results. It can be discussed how experimental and \;non-experimental kinds of empirical work are received\, applied and resisted \;in various legal domains. The role of common sense in the law can be \;assessed analytically\, comparatively\, or critically. The relationship of \;empirical research and doctrinal knowledge can be discussed from \;philosophical\, historical or sociological perspectives.
The workshop is the third yearly event of MetaLawEcon\, an international \;research network on the philosophical and methodological foundations of \;economic analysis of law. We also expect and explicitly encourage \;participation of scholars who do not associate themselves with &lsquo\;law and \;economics'.
Reasonable travel costs and accommodation \;for speakers will be covered.
Paper proposals (with an abstract of max. 1 page) should be sent by 25 May \;2012 to Peter Cserne (cserne@jak.ppke.hu).