This workshop aims to bring together early-career researchers in law\, philosophy\, neuroscience\, and psychology to explore in what way\, if any\, recent findings in neuroscience (broadly construed) can inform debates on the source of voluntary action and the related notions of moral and criminal responsibility.
\nIssues that might be addressed are: Should we hold criminals diagnosed with psychopathy less accountable for their crimes given that studies show that psychopaths have reduced moral judgment and/or empathy? Does evidence from neuroscience and behavioral genetics have any implications for the scope of circumstances that are understood as &ldquo\;mitigating&rdquo\;? Does such evidence have any bearing on whether the purpose of punishment for criminal acts should be conceived as a matter of retribution or rehabilitation? Do the &ldquo\;timing experiments&rdquo\; by Benjamin Libet and others fundamentally undermine the voluntary control condition that many compatibilists claim is a condition for moral accountability? If so\, does it in turn also undermine the condition for criminal responsibility?
ORGANIZER;CN=Helen Beebee;CN=Marion Godman: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR