Many philosophers think that philosophy shouldn't merely rely on a \;priori reasoning\, but should somehow take evidence from experience\, \;including experimental evidence form sciences\, into account. That \;seems to be a reasonable methodological principle\, at least if we \;accept the existence of something like a mind-independent reality. \;However\, the way philosophers consider empirical evidence to constrain \;philosophical tenets vary very much among different approaches. On the \;one hand\, "classical" empiricists tend to be constructionist (and more \;broadly anti-realist) with respect to the ontological import of the \;theoretical aspects of accepted theories\, while rationalists have a \;overall realist approach to theoretical tenets. On the other hand\, the \;new trend of "experimental philosophy" aims at dismissing a priori \;reasoning of any sort as valuable in assessing philosophical theses\, \;by arguing that we should test philosophers' intuitions as hypotheses \;about the behavior of ordinary people\, while philosophers who oppose \;that trend tend to grant to the intuitions of the "experts" a special \;status--even if they do not share overall confidence into a priori \;theorizing. How should we appraise the relevance of empirical evidence \;for philosophical discussion? When is a priori reasoning legitimate? \;Can we regard empirical evidence about intuitions a different status \;from empirical constraints from hard sciences in general? The workshop \;aims at promoting a discussion about those and related topics.
\nOrganized by:
\nLabont -- Laboratory for Ontology\, University of Turin\, Italy \;http://labont.it
\nInstitute for Philosophy and Social Theory\, University of Belgrade\, \;Serbia
ORGANIZER;CN=Petar Bojanic;CN=Giuliano Torrengo: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR