Common-sense about meaning and perception
\nYou wonder if it is raining outside. One way to address this question is to listen for the sound of rain on the roof. Another is to go outside and look. Yet another is to ask someone who has been outside and attend to the words that come out of their mouth. After reading Saul Kripke's puzzling Pierre paper\, you wonder if Paris is indeed pretty and plan to make your way to Paris and see for yourself. But how do you get to Paris? One way is to utter certain sentences that contain the word 'Paris' in front of a travel agent and then do what they advise.
\n\nAre the claims in the above paragraph news? Of course not. This tells us something important about the philosophy of perception and the philosophy of language. Our theories of meaning and of perceptual experience had better explain why what is said in that paragraph is full of commonplaces. In these lectures I will defend views about meaning (in the sense of reference) and about perceptual experience\, which explain why those commonplaces are commonplaces. I will also say something about how this connects with conceptual analysis.
\n\n1. How to think about perceptual content and how this delivers "feel"
\nThere is something very attractive about a relational account of perceptual experience but\, for reasons we will review\, it cannot be right. I will argue that a certain\, independently attractive account of perceptual content tells us what to put in its place. As we will see\, what we need to put in its place explains why perceptual experience is such a wonderful source of information.
\n\n2. Two-dimensionalism for Mooreans
\nThis lecture is about primary/A intensions versus secondary/C intensions\, and associated issues to do with the necessary a posteriori and all that. The material will be presented in a way that makes it accessible to philosophers in general\, not just philosophy of language mavens. I happen to believe that two-dimensionalism is largely common-sense &ndash\; thus the reference to (G.E.) Moore &ndash\; once one bears in mind the informational role of sentences.
\n\n3. Conceptual analysis for explainers and predictors
\nIn this lecture\, I argue that conceptual analysis is a natural offshoot of the way we all &ndash\; be we philosophers\, economists\, physicists\, or ... &ndash\; often seek to explain and predict what happens in our world and are able to use words in doing this.
\n\n4. Public lecture: The nature of Mind: What kind of materialist should I be?
\n\n \n \n \n \n \n Normal\n 0\n \n \n 21\n \n \n false\n false\n false\n \n DE\n JA\n X-NONE\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n
Debates over materialism have become complex juggling acts. We need &ndash\; somehow &ndash\; to give due weight to the competing claims of the identity theory and of functionalism\, while\, at the same time\, saying something sensible about the phenomenal side of psychology. In this lecture\, I steer a path through the jungle.
ORGANIZER;CN=Albert Newen;CN=Tobias Schlicht: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR