According to W. V. Quine's \;Two Dogmas of Empiricism\, logic is a science. Like theories in physics\, economics\, and biology\, logical theories may be revised\, and sometimes even as a result of empirical evidence. In advocating a gradualism between logic and the empirical sciences\, Quine subverts the foundationalist ambitions of logic. Logic cannot be justified \;a priori\, nor are the truths of logic analytic. \;
\nQuine's anti-exceptionalism about logic has opened up a series of important questions. What are logical theories theories of? What counts as evidence for such theories? What are the criteria for theory choice in logic? Do these criteria\, whatever they are\, favour classical logic or nonclassical logic? And what is left of the normative status of logic if we accept Quine's gradualism?
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