Do newborns have a sense of agency?
\nI will argue that newborn babies have experiences of agency. \; I present evidence from developmental psychology involving four types of behaviors (neonatal imitation\, actions oriented to goals\, actions toward objects\, and actions toward people) and argue that this evidence supports a prima facie case that babies have experiences of agency. \; I then address objections. \; An important objection is that experiences of agency involve a higher-order attribution of agency generated by a high-level cognitive mechanism\, which requires self-consciousness and a self-concept\, and that babies lack the capacity for self-consciousness and a self-concept. \; In the absence of these capacities\, babies can be at best aware of certain actions they perform and not of their own agency in those actions. \; I will argue for an intermediate view on which the experience of agency requires nonconceptual self-representation but not a self-concept. \; If this view is correct\, the lack of conceptual self-consciousness is no obstacle to the claim that babies have agency experience. \; I also argue that some actions by newborns involve only action-awareness while others involve agency-awareness\, and that consequently some but not all actions in babies involve the experience of agency.
\nAfter another talk 1-2pm (by Laura Pé\;rez "Visual Properties and Social Groups") a reception will follow.
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