Invited speakers:
Corine Besson (University of Sussex)
Hartry Field (NYU)
Anandi Hattiangadi (Stockholm University)
John MacFarlane (Standford University)
Richard Pettigrew (University of Bristol)
Florian Steinberger (Birkbeck)
Timothy Williamson (University of Oxford)
Logic tells you what follows from what\, it tells you when an argument is valid\, and when a theory is inconsistent. So\, logic describes what follows from your attitudes\, whether your reasoning is valid\, and whether your beliefs are consistent. \;
It is widely held that in addition logic provides epistemic norms. Logic prescribes what someone with your attitudes ought to believe\, how you ought to reason and whether your current epistemic state is permissible. These epistemic norms have authority over mental states and acts akin to how moral norms have authority over ordinary acts. To violate these norms is to do something epistemologically impermissible. It is to be irrational.
In recent years there has been a resurgent interest in the normativity of logic\, including attempts at saying clearly what those epistemic norms actually are\, and what their import is in cases of belief revision.
Following this trend\, this conference is devoted to questions such as:
Call for papers:
Submission deadline: March 1st\, 2017
Notification to authors: March 15th\, 2017
Registration deadline: May 1st\, 2017
Conference dates: June 14-16th\, 2017
The organizers welcome submissions on any topic related to the normativity of logic. Submissions should be abstracts of about 1000 words\, anonymized for blind refereeing (.doc\, .docx\, or .pdf).
Please send your abstract \;to antiexceptionalism@gmail.com. \;The email should include title\, name\, and \;institutional affiliation.
We especially encourage submissions from PhD candidates\, early career researchers\, and members of groups that are underrepresented in philosophy.