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DTSTAMP:20260607T020303Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20170421T070000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20170421T090000
SUMMARY:SWIP-Analytic 2017 Graduate Student Essay Prize Winner Presentation
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TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION:NYU Philosophy Department\, 5 Washington Place\, New York\, United States
DESCRIPTION:<p>Please join us for <strong>Marion Boulicalt's</strong> presentation of <strong>'The Contingency of Logical Necessity'</strong> on <strong>April 21st </strong>from<strong> 11am-1pm</strong>&nbsp\;in the <strong>NYU Philosophy Department (5 Washington Place\, New York\, NY\, Room 202)</strong>. Marion is the winner of the SWIP-Analytic's 2017 Graduate Student Essay Prize. Registration is not required\, and all are welcome. <strong>Katherine Ritchie</strong> of CUNY's City College will be providing comments.</p>\n<p><strong>Abstract: </strong>According to a standard account\, logical relations between propositions exist independently of contingent facts\, norms and practices. David Bloor challenges this standard account by arguing that\, rather than existing independently of contingent facts\, logical relations arise from them: &ldquo\;logical necessity is a moral and social relation&rdquo\; (1983\, 121\, emphasis added). In this essay\, I examine Bloor&rsquo\;s argument for this bold claim. After first considering and rejecting an objection raised by Ian Hacking\, I propose an alternative objection to Bloor&rsquo\;s social account of logical necessity. However\, I end by suggesting that this objection poses a parallel justificatory problem for the standard account of logical necessity. In other words\, both the standard and the social account of logical necessity suffer from parallel problems of justification.</p>
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