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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260604T043741Z
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Nicosia:20170321T083000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Nicosia:20170323T130000
SUMMARY:Intentionality: New Directions
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TZID:Asia/Nicosia
LOCATION:Peterhouse\, Trumpington Street\, Cambridge\, United Kingdom\, CB2 1RD
DESCRIPTION:<p>Philosophical theorising about intentionality - the mind&rsquo\;s capacity to represent the world - has been dominated by attempts to reduce intentionality to physical or causal relations between thinkers and objects. This focus on reduction has led to a number of philosophically interesting features of intentionality being ignored. This workshop offers a reorientation of the study of intentionality away from the reductive project\, instead focusing on the phenomenon of intentionality itself and the role it plays in our mental life. Such a reorientation opens up a number of potentially fruitful avenues for investigation:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>What can be learnt about intentionality by focusing on the phenomenon from the first-person perspective? Is perceptual consciousness essentially intentional or representational? Is there a proprietary phenomenology associated with conscious thought?</li>\n</ul>\n<ul>\n<li>How can our understanding of intentionality be informed by the psychological sciences? For example\, how does cognitive psychology&rsquo\;s concept of &lsquo\;representation&rsquo\; relate to our common sense understanding of how thoughts and feelings are &lsquo\;about&rsquo\; things in the world?</li>\n</ul>\n<ul>\n<li>How can the history of intentionality and related concepts inform how we think of the mind? For example\, what are the similarities and differences between Locke&rsquo\;s &lsquo\;ideas&rsquo\;\, Kant&rsquo\;s &lsquo\;representations&rsquo\;\, Brentano&rsquo\;s concept of &lsquo\;intentional inexistence&rsquo\;\, and Russell&rsquo\;s &lsquo\;propositional attitudes&rsquo\;?</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Registration is <strong>free</strong>. Everyone is welcome\, though spaces are limited. To register\, please visit our website using the link below.</p>\n<p>Any queries? Get in touch by email: newdirectionsmindproject@gmail.com</p>\n<p>This Workshop is a part of the New Directions in the Study of the Mind project\, based in the Faculty of Philosophy in Cambridge\, and supported by the John Templeton Foundation.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Tim  Crane;CN=Alexander Greenberg:
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