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PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260605T123914Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20170324T103000
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20170324T120000
SUMMARY:Two senses of narrative unification
UID:20260608T105030Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Australia/Melbourne
LOCATION:Monash University\, Clayton\, Australia\, 3800
DESCRIPTION:<p>Narrative theories of identity make a range of claims about using the notion of narrative to understand persons\, and some claim that the synchronic and diachronic unity of a person can be understood in narrative terms. Focusing on Schechtman&rsquo\;s (1996) narrative account\, I argue that such a claim reveals a tension in narrative theories\, which I will demonstrate by showing that theory has conflicting implications when applied to cases of radical personal change. &nbsp\;I examine how attempts to resolve this problem have led Schechtman to modify her account in way that amounts to abandoning the use of the notion of narrative to capture a sense of personal unity. I then propose an alternative response\, which could allow narrative theorists to retain some of their claims about narrative unity\, by developing a distinction between two senses in which we might think that narrative is unifying.</p>
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